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Welcome to the world's largest web site on MIG , Flux Cored and TIG. Weld Process Controls & Best Weld Practices. To get to the root cause of GMAW (MIG) & Flux Cored (FCAW) weld issues, requires Weld Process Control - Best Practice Expertise, & lots of Weld Reality. The site provides the MIG - Flux Cored and TIG weld information and data required to attain the highest possible manual and robot weld quality, always at the lowest possible weld costs.

This web site was first established in 1997 by Ed Craig. Contact Ed. ecraig@weldreality.com

Lincoln Self Shielded Flux cored Weld Wires
and Apathetic, Chrysler WELD Management:

The prime cause of all robot weld issues starts in the front office.

An E-mail addressed to this site.

Ed. The tier one automotive parts company I work for has been told by the Chrysler corporate weld engineer that we have to use "self shielding flux cored wires" when welding galvaneald steel parts. The Lincoln self shielded flux cored wires we have tried have caused us numerous welding issues. Our robot weld rework rates so far have been in the sixty to a hundred percent range. The robot operators and workers around the robot cells frequently complain about the self shielded weld fumes and the paint shop is appalled at having to paint over a weld slag that is very difficult to remove. Ed what is the logical justification for using these useless steel weld wires?

Ed's Answer:
I feel your pain. This self shielded flux cored nonsense has been going on for more a decade. Let me tell you one weld application story about the same Chrysler engineer and how over a decade his companies "self shielded, flux cored wire recommendations" have cost his company at least fifty million dollars.

Stage One: 1995 - 96, the $800,000 per-month Neon Cross member Robot Weld Fiasco:

The following weld application is a description of a robot weld management disaster and how a big three weld engineer along with some good old weld product salesmanship had dramatic cost repercussions for both Chrysler and it's part suppliers. This unique robot weld application is an indication of the costly damage that can result from apathetic engineering management and unqualified engineers, individuals who lack the ability to or take ownership of their equipment or responsibility for their weld process decisions.

It was late 1995: The Chrysler Twinsburg plant manager had requested that I assist him with a major robot weld issue occurring at his plant. I knew from my short conversation with this man that he was an excellent manufacturing manager and let's face it, you have to be a top gun manufacturing manager to manage Chrysler's prime Minivan stamping facility.

Looking very frustrated with his plant's robot weld issues, the Chrysler manager informed me that in the past his plant had not been involved with "robot welds" and the issues on his newly installed robot line were making him ill.

The new multi-million dollar robot line was set up in his plant to weld Neon cross member parts. The plant manager informed me that the robot cell quality / production issues on this line was costing his plant > $800,000 per month. At the time of our meeting the cross member robot weld repairs and weld production issues had gone on for more than a year, costing Chrysler approx. 10 million dollars.

POOR DESIGN AND POOR WELD MANAGEMENT: The Neon steel cross member parts to be welded, ranged from 1.5 to 2 mm thick. From a weld perspective I pointed out to the Chrysler team that the overlap parts were poorly designed. The cross member parts were made out of two sections that overlapped, as indicated in the left sketch. In the robot welded, continuos lap seam joint, the 1.5 mm section became the weld base of the horizontal welded joint. A simple fact that few Chrysler designers were aware of, it's much more difficult to create weld burn through a 2 mm part than it is to burn through a part 1.5 mm, especially when you use large weld wires and have poor joint fit and weld gaps up to 4 mm. This common weld design oversight, along with the incorrect selection of weld consumables selected contributed to the extensive weld burn through.

THE SELECTION OF SOME OF THE WORST WELDING CONSUMABLES AVAILABLE: The welded parts were "galvanealed". To weld the parts the Chrysler corporate weld engineer had selected a variety of self shielded wires. The self shielding wires utilized were Lincoln, E71T-G (NR 212) and NR 211 wires. The weld wire size available at that time was 5/64 wire. The Lincoln Electric plant that made the wires was less than 20 miles away and Lincoln was involved in the decision to utilize this weld wire. The self shielded flux cored weld wire selected for the very thin cross members were large and required a weld current range of 280 to 350 amps. Note. Approx. 320 - 330 amps is the optimum current for this size weld wire. The high weld current required for this wire had more in common with robot welding steel applications > 1/4 (> 6 mm) thick, rather than welding thin gage parts 1.5 mm with gaps.

THE LACK OF ABILITY TO MAKE PARTS TO THE DESIGN TOLERANCES. When the top part and bottom part of the new stamped cross member components were joined together, there were extensive weld gaps typically 2 to 4 mm between the parts. Possibly the self shielded weld wire was initially selected as its a "straight polarity" weld wire in which most the weld heat goes into the part rather than to the wire as it does with reverse polarity. Keep in mind with this type of weld wire, only large wire sizes were available. What the Chrysler engineer did not appear to realize, that irrespective of the weld polarity of a weld consumable, a thin gage part retains a great portion of it's weld heat and therefore can only take so much weld current. The bottom line, as any weld technician with six months experience would have known, the 280 - 320 amps and the 1.5 mm steels were simply not compatible.

Compatible or not, the large self shielded weld consumable was the wire selected by the Chrysler weld engineer for the robot line. It's interesting to note that at that time, this weld wire was not marketed by any wire manufacture including Lincoln as a weld wire designed specifically for "thin galvanealed or galvanized parts".

The high weld current required by the Lincoln straight polarity, self shielded flux cored wires, created so many weld burn holes in the Neon parts that during each shift Chrysler had to utilize up to 13 manual weld personnel to manually weld over the entire robot flux cored welds. The welding fumes and conditions were so bad at the end of the robot line that the MANUAL REPAIR WELDERS HAD TO WEAR FRESH AIR BREATHING MASKS and due to health concerns the management had to rotate the manual repair welders every four hours. The picture above right shows the typical weld fumes generated by the Lincoln self shielded flux core wires when exhaust equipment is not used.

Once this poor excuse for a weld wire was embedded in the Chrysler plant, the weld folklore, myths and process chaos began. When asked why he choose a weld wire that was causing numerous weld quality, productivity and safety issues, the Chrysler weld engineer would inform all that his choice of this self shielding weld wire was necessary when "welding steel galvanealed applications". From that day onwards he was committed to that incorrect, multi million statement and for years to come all Chrysler part suppliers had to weld galvanealed parts with this unsuitable weld consumable.

The daily weld rework on the Chrysler Neon cross members was often 100% and the weld reject rate of the robot sub assembly parts averaged 60 to 100%.

Note: THE INFLUENCE OF SALESMANSHIP ON AN INDUSTRY THAT OFTEN RELIES ON SALES ADVICE: Later on, as the use of galvanealed parts grew and as the Lincoln self shielded weld wire sales grew at the Chrysler and their tier plants welding galvanealed applications, Lincoln changed it's self shielding sales literature to read

"This self shielded flux cored wires is developed for single and multiple pass, semiautomatic and automatic welding of mild steel, sheet metal, plate and coated applications

Without any weld metallurgical justification, Lincoln changed it's self shielded marketing for the consumables in question and informed it's weld customers that "these "self shielded flux cored wires were designed for coated steel" applications. This data is available on the Lincoln web site under self shielded data Nov. 27 / 05.

THERE IS A REASON YOU HAVE TO CLICK ON A BULL TO ENTER THIS WEB SITE: Some weld consumable manufacturers, (not all) will recommend a weld consumable that their competitors do not sell. Typically this so called unique weld consumable may not be the best weld consumable for the intended application, however this common weld sales tactic ensures no one else can bid on on the weld consumable business. In the auto / truck industry, where few managers want ownership of the weld processes in their plants, once a weld consumable is selected, it's typically embedded in concrete and could be used for decades.

Any reputable welding technician and Lincoln has a few, would be aware that irrespective of the weld polarity utilized, > 300 plus amps is simply not compatible with 1.5 mm gage parts. Is it possible that the Chrysler weld engineer never had the ambition to acquire the weld knowledge of a reputable weld technician? If so it's unfortunate as the choice of the weld wire has cost his company and part suppliers millions in weld rejects and rework.

On the right is a picture of the self shielded flux cored weld. Its a pity people who buy cars don't get to see the welds that hold their cars together.

The majority of the self shielded robot welds were full of weld burn through holes and had welds that were coated with a surface weld slag. The parts with the weld defects were not cleaned before the second manual repair pass was made.

Note the heavily contaminated weld slag that occurs with these welds. To try to remove this slag from the robot weld surface was a hopeless task as the tenacious slag was influenced by the high weld current used and it was almost impossible to remove.
Due to the weld conditions, weld alloy and impurities content and surface slag formed, no process or consumable was suited to make the manual weld repairs, however the repairs were made with the same weld self shielded wires.

Every junior weld technician that has anything to do with welding would know that no weld should be made over the top of another weld when the first weld has slag on it's surface, however the Chrysler engineers did not seem concerned.

IT WAS NOT A SMALL WELD REPAIR: As the robot weld burn through was so extensive around the cross member seam weld that held the two cross member parts together, the manual repair welders would frequently weld around the complete cross member seam. In most instances the manual welders wearing breathing masks would make a repair welds approx. 100 inches long.

The second pass, manual repair welds were made over the total robot seam weld. Can you imagine how these over sized, over heated welds full of defects and questionable alloy combinations on the thin 1.5 to 2 mm parts, would perform in a crash test. If you cannot imagine try this data.

1998: Three years after I tried to get Chrysler management to do the right thing and improve the welds on the Neon, the following collision data was presented by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety.


Chrysler Neon 1998 Injury, Collision, Indicators

Index: Score: Rating:

Injury Index 131. This is substantially worse than average score of 100.

These scores are stated in relative terms, with 100 being the average for all cars in each category. Scores greater than 100 represent higher risk in each category. For example, an injury indicator score of 131 means that a passenger in this model is 31% more likely to be injured in an accident.

The injury, collision, indicators for the 1998 PLYMOUTH NEON are provided by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, Highway Loss Data Institute. Learn more about these results.

March 2005. After a decade of self shielded flux cored, on national TV, a Crash Test organization announced that of all the cars it tested in 2005 the Chrysler Neon got the worst crash test results.

WELD APPEARANCE: The manual repair welds were made on top of defective welds that either burnt through, had lack of weld fusion and extensive porosity and entrapped weld slag. Off course the resulting welds would have poor mechanical and fatigue properties. Not that anyone seemed to care but the finished weld quality on this project would be frowned on in a third world country weld shop, (ironically this project did end up in a plant in Mexico).

E-COAT FOR CORROSION PROTECTION: It was very difficult to remove the self shielded weld slag, so you can be sure on these welded parts the E Coat which was later applied did not adhere as it should, well who's worried about corrosion when the parts are not mechanically sound.

SINGLE PASS WELD WIRES: It's ironic that some the self shielded weld wires that made the welds were at this time approved by the AWS for "single pass welds only". A single weld pass limitation for a weld consumable is an indication of either excess or uncontrolled alloy content in the weld wire. When requiring weld repairs and welding with two layers, these weld wires will automatically result in excess alloy content resulting typically in welds that may have poor ductility. The weld chemistry and weld mechanical issues generated by the two weld layers are further aggravated when you add the affects of excess slag, excess weld heat, internal weld defects along with the addition of zinc from the galvanealed coating.




[] A self shielded weld wire recommendation for auto / truck parts would never be accepted by a knowledgeable weld engineer and this weld wire recommendation would never be accepted in a facility that prides itself on it's engineering, weld production and weld quality capability.

[] The self shielded weld wire recommendation would never be accepted by a facility that has pride in the components it builds and worries about weld quality, weld mechanicals and product liability.

[] The self shielded weld wire recommendation would never be accepted by any management who is concerned about the health of its workers.

[] The lack of an effective manual weld repair procedure would not have been approved in an organization that is concerned about the weld integrity on the parts it delivers.

[] The self shielded wire more than doubled the production time required to produce the parts.


Poor quality, self shielded robot welds and poor robot weld
production rates were not the only weld problems in the Chrysler plant.
The self shielded weld wires had alloys that were maxed out (PEL) in the MSD sheets. The alloy levels in the weld wires recommended create a serious health hazard and some of the self shielded wires accepted and still in use have alloys which in the form of smoke or dust are classed as "carcinogenic". The robot cells utilized had exhaust units, however the manual repair welders working
near the cells were required to wear breathing apparatus and the smoke from the manual weld repair area floated throughout the rest of the plant.
This photo
Shows the SS smoke generated in a plant wothout ventilation.

Another concern with the self shielded flux cored wires that create so
much weld rework is the grinding and cleaning of the welds on the parts to be repaired or coated. The dust created from the rework also creates a severe safety hazard.

Once the self shielded, high level alloy particles and dust from grinding repairs get into your shop air how do you control it? The bottom line you don't have to worry about weld fume or dust controls if you make rational weld engineering decisions and refuse to use these weld consumables.

JOB SATISFACTION, WORKERS, FATIGUE, WELDER TURN OVER AND LIABILITY: For those of you not used to these self shielded wires promoted by Lincoln Electric, please be aware that your robot operators and weld repair personnel when working with these weld consumables can expect fatigue, and other weld fume symptoms. The company using these products can also anticipate employee turn over issues and poor worker moral. Perhaps one day a knowledgeable person in the plant that uses these products will pick up the dusty, rarely opened MSD specifications for these weld wires and become aware of the potential weld fume safety issues.

The sad part about making worker use these products is that the self shielded wires were not necessary for the application in the first place. These welds could be made with the cleaner MIG process and lower cost MIG wires. On the galvanealed parts, the MIG process fumes would offer no known safety hazards and the welds would provide greater weld quality and productivity potential.


By the way, if the self shielded products could achieve what the Chrysler corporate engineer claimed and Lincoln Electric they could do, every car / truck plant in the world would be using these obnoxious products. The weld reality is the majority of companies worldwide that weld both galvanealed and hot dipped galvanized steel applications have always successfully used the MIG process with conventional steel MIG wires and two part gas mixes.


The frustrated and very tense Chrysler plant manager informed me he had little respect for the weld advice coming from his corporate center. He asked if I would present a proposal to the corporate engineering team responsible and rectify the costly robot weld problems for the welded cross members.

WITH ROBOT WELD ISSUES, YOU FIRST HAVE TO RESOLVE THE PEOPLE ISSUES. I knew it would be a difficult task to convince the engineer who had made the weld wire decision, to admit that he had made a multi-million mistake about a simple two control weld process. I therefore proposed to the plant manager that rather than waste time trying to cut through egos in denial or have exhaustive discussions with inexperienced individuals, I would present to the Chrysler corporation engineering team responsible for the Neon cross members, the following practical proposal.

I would simply MIG weld the parts with a robot using both the MIG and self shielded flux cored process and let the resulting mechanical tests, weld quality and productivity data from an outside, unbiased, testing agency speak for itself.

For the welds on the cross member parts, I would utilize a reputable Detroit testing agency. The weld test data would be taken from both the MIG and self shielding welds. The report would provide micro / macro weld and HAZ samples. Appropriate hardness tests for welds and HAZ and tensile tests.

THE NEW NEON CROSS MEMBER WELD PROCEDURE: I robot welded the Neon cross member parts using the common E70S-3, and 0.045 and 0.035 (1.2 -1 mm) MIG wires. I selected the 70S- 3 as it has lower silicon and manganese than the E70S-6 MIG wire, (less alloy reactions with the galvanealed).

THE AUTO INDUSTRY HAS FOR DECADES BEEN MAKING INCORRECT WELD WIRE DECISIONS. The E70S-6 MIG wire has for three decades mistakenly been used throughout the global auto and truck weld industry for zinc coated applications. Lower silicon in the weld as available with the S3 wire, can reduce the potential for micro weld cracks when combined with the zinc found in galvanized and galvanealed coatings.

For some of the the robot cross member project welds, I used the E70S-3, MIG weld wire and argon - 10% CO2 in the spray transfer mode in the 200 to 220 amp range, much lower than the 280 plus amps used with the self shielded wires. With the robot welds I also used the short circuit process using 160 to 180 amps which was beneficial on the parts where the weld gaps were most sever. In less than 5 days I eliminated the majority of the weld burn through issues, established the required robot cross member and sub assembly procedures. It took another week for the Detroit Testing Agency to provide the weld test results.

I sent the Detroit Testing agency both the new MIG cross member samples on the galvanealed parts and the self shielded
weld samples. The resulting weld test report indicated that in contrast to the self shielded wires, all the MIG welds provided superior weld / mechanical results and the MIG welds all passed the mechanical destructive and CDT tests with flying colors.

With the Chrysler MIG robot welded parts and weld report in the back of the car I went back to the Chrysler Corporate Center and presented the results in an extensive report to all the engineers on the cross member team. I placed the new welded parts on the table the quality of which they had never seen before. I kept the presentation simple and to the point. By the way my MIG weld data also provided Chrysler with a great bonus as I increased the robot weld speed and resulting weld productivity by 30%. I also reduced the total weld rework from 100% to an anticipated 8%. Yes some weld rework was still required due to the poor part fit and excess weld gaps < 4 mm in the parts.

The weld solutions I presented at the Chrysler meeting in January 1996, would immediately save Chrysler approx. $800,000 per month and increase the cross member robot weld productivity by 30%. All the weld data presented at this meeting indicated that the primary issue was with the weld process and consumables selected. The poor part fit issues could be addressed with a possible die change which the engineers informed me was in the budget.

The Chrysler corporate management who managed the engineers responsible for the parts received the report. I knew that these managers and their engineers and designers understood little about the weld processes discussed so I kept the report data at a level anyone can understand. The new MIG test weld data was very well received by the Chrysler plant manager and by all the corporate, cross member team except by one individual, "the Chrysler weld engineer". I thought the battle was over, however it turned out to be a battle I never would win.

CHRYSLER WELD ENGINEER DENIAL: After I left, I found out that the Chrysler weld engineer denied that the problem was with his wire selection and insisted that the self shielded wires had to be used to compensate for the galvanealed coating. His peers ALL HIGHLY TRAINED ENGINEERS had all seen the engineering evidence necessary to know that the wrong process had been used, however they simply did not have the balls to stand up to the weld engineer and let him have his way.

It's obvious the Chrysler weld engineer was not interested in the success of the MIG process on his companies parts. It's evident he was concerned about protecting his "credibility" as an engineer. Lets face it, who wants it known that you are the individual that's responsible for a the multi-million dollar loss for your corporation.

To show his team his "flexibility" for change, the Chrysler weld engineer allowed the use of a slightly smaller self shielded weld wire to weld his cross member parts.

After 15 pus million dollars lost to rework and rejects, the President of Chrysler decided that his less than two year old, state of the art, multi-million dollar, cross member weld line was a project he wanted buried and therefore did what many Detroit executives have done in the past. Rather than fire his weld engineer, the Chrysler president "gave up on the project" and made the brilliant management engineering decision to sweep his robot weld issues under a rug located in Mexico.

The president of Chrysler decided that the new state of the art robot line in his Ohio plant should be shut down. The new robots, the million dollar fixtures and what should have been a simple common weld application that would have been welded with ease using MIG, would now be moved south to Mexico.

I suppose the Chrysler president anticipated that in Mexico there would be less objections to the use of the self shielded wires and of course less concern for the manual weld repair costs and the safety and environmental issues. Mexico can thank America for many jobs, but this is not one of them.

By the way I later visited the plant in Mexico where these part were being made. It was the same weld mess, only instead of a providing a new die that provided parts that fit to the design tolerances the plant provided the Mexican workers with "hammers". The welds were still full of holes and still made with the same consumables, only this time I did not see workers using fresh air helmets when doing the manual welds.

MORE EVIDENCE THIS TIME FROM A LITTLE COMPANY CALLED US STEEL: Its 2OO4: Eight years had passed and I was back at the Chrysler corporate center face to face with you know who. The same corporate weld engineer was still working for the Chrysler, in a way I was surprised that he had not been promoted to some VP position.

I was back at Chrysler in a consultant roll to discuss another galvaneal project handled by a tier one supplier. I was basically talking to many of the same Chrysler engineering group. This time I represented a supplier who was loosing over $250,000 annually because he was made to use the same self shielded wires on some small galvanealed parts. At this meeting new weld test data was presented along with an unusual letter that I had attained from a company that knows a little about steel components, the letter was from US Steel.

The US Steel Corporation makes most of the high strength galvanealed steels sold in North America. In the letter which was addressed to Chrysler, the US Steel chief metallurgist recommended that the MIG process rather than the self shielded SS process be used for the coated steel applications. Again the data we presented was well received by the majority of Chrysler corporate engineers and also by a very frustrated Chrysler purchasing manager who chaired the meeting. It seems the purchasing manager was fed up with dealing with suppliers who had many complaints against the use of the self shielded flux cored weld wires. The Chrysler Corporate Purchasing manager chaired the weld meeting and he did not looking pleased with his weld engineer.

I was not aware till some of the engineers informed me that It seems over the years the purchasing manager had to attend too many of these self shielded weld wire meetings with many other disgruntled tier suppliers. Let's face it, all good purchasing personnel are driven by cost reduction and this purchasing manager knew that many times Chrysler had been presented with great opportunities for multi-million dollar weld cost reduction and yet over and over he had seen the engineering team turn their backs on engineering logic.

At the end of the day these Lincoln self shielded weld wire meetings always got bogged down as the weld engineer would stand his ground and would not back down on his process decision. This meeting as with the presentation eight years ago, again provided over overwhelming evidence along with the support letter from US Steel, yet the Chrysler weld engineer stood behind his choice of the self shielded weld consumables. This report also took a further step in the examination of "fatigue properties". The report dealt with crash weld test data and showed their were unusual weld failure issues occurring with the self shielded wire welds, while all the MIG welds passed the tests. With all the evidence the Chrysler weld engineer would again not allow the change to MIG.

Each supplier who used the self shielded products and bought the related weld issues and considerable cost savings from the MIG process to the table for Chrysler was shot down by the Chrysler weld engineer.

From a weld mechanical, weld chemistry, weld quality and weld productivity perspective, in contrast to MIG wires, the self shielded flux cored wires when tested offer no weld benefits, the Lincoln self shielded wires do however offer;

[a] excess weld spatter,
[b] tenacious difficult to remove weld slag,
[c] poor weld fill and inconsistent weld fusion potential,
[d] higher weld consumable costs,
weld fumes that should be considered a hazard.
[f] higher than normal weld repair rates that lead to excess part heat on high strength, coated thin gage applications. This heat can greatly reduce both the part mechanical properties and lower the corrosion resistance along side the welds.
[g] welds with excess porosity and slag inclusions will lower fatigue and impact properties.
[h] welds in which quality weld repairs will always be suspect.


2005: Conclusion: Today you will find the self shielded weld wires used at many big three locations, this statement is simply a reflection of the sheep leading the sheep and of course general lack of weld process expertise that prevails at these corporations.

After a decade of costly weld disasters since this product was first used on the Neon, the self shielded flux cored weld wire recommendation is still endorsed in 2005 by the same Chrysler corporate engineer.
Is it a coincidence that in March 2005 ten years after my discussions with Chrysler a major Crash Test organization announced that of all the cars it tested in 2005 the Chrysler Neon got the worst crash test results?

As with most robot weld problems, the weld issues are typically people issues. I think when you look at this situation in this report, you may want to know why the managers and engineering team at Chrysler did not do their job. If you are an engineer involved in welding decisions and you have minimal weld process control expertise, it's easy to understand why you will not want to take a stand against a person who is supposed to be qualified. However when you are handed evidence such as presented in this report and you don't react, you did not do the job you are paid to do. I anticipate at least 30 million dollars has now been lost to the weld process decision made at Chrysler. If I was Chrysler management I would use this report for future engineer training sessions called "How not Run a Project" If I was a Chrysler Purchasing Manager I would use this report to show management how engineers can impede cost reduction.

May 2006 E-Mail From PL England.


I have just read your Chrysler Neon article regarding the cross members and self shielded flux cored wire issues. I fully endorse your views and comments. Its a shame that many "welding engineers" in the automotive industry lack the actual knowledge and skills to fulfill this critical role. I myself am a welding engineer for a tier one supplier to the auto industry and see this too often. As a time served boilermaker in the UK, I feel that there is an extensive lack of weld process knowledge and experience with the welding and engineering personnel in the auto / truck industry. I must also thank you for your books 'A Management & Engineering Guide to MIG & the Training' materials both of which we as a company refer to regularly.

Cheers Mate.

PL - England


The bottom line. In the North American Auto industry I can count on the fingers on one hand the engineers who truly understand the processes that are used to join their metal parts. However it's just not an engineering or robot problem. The sad reality is after two decades of using robots and weld process apathy, the senior corporate management at all the major North American and Japanese auto / truck manufacturers lack the ability to recognize the fundamental human requirements necessary to establish robot weld process controls.






There are many common denominators in this story and in the Lincoln self shielded wires selected for CA buildings that suffered in the North Ridge earth quake.

Chrysler Recall date:
Units potentially affected: 3,683

NHTSA campaign number: 99V001000
Defective part or component: STRUCTURE:BODY

Description: Vehicle Description: Passenger vehicles. The rear suspension Cross Member may be missing welds. This condition can result in structural cracks in the body, and reduced crash protection in the event of a rear impact. Dealers will inspect the vehicles for any missing welds, and will have structural rivets installed in place of the missing welds.

Chrysler Neon 1998 Injury, Collision, Indicators

Index: Score: Rating:
Injury Index 131 Substantially worse than average of 100

These scores are stated in relative terms, with 100 being the average for all cars in each category. Scores greater than 100 represent higher risk in each category. For example, an injury indicator score of 131 means that a passenger in this model is 31% more likely to be injured in an accident. The injury, collision, indicators for the 1998 PLYMOUTH NEON are provided by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, Highway Loss Data Institute. Learn more about these results.

2009: May 5. This week as Chrysler heads towards bankruptcy and Fiat looks to take over this basket case of a corporation, one thing Fiat needs to realize, when it buys into this company. It will take ownership of out dated plants and engineers and managers who don't exactly have a track record they can be proud of.

If the Chrysler Engineer had purchased my $300 robot weld process control, self teaching / training resources, or my Management - Engineers Guide to MIG and Flux Cored, he would have learnt someting they did not teach at the University that he graduated from, and he would have saved his Chrysler and their suppliers millions of dollars.




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